When people talk about self-driving cars, they usually talk about them as though they’re in the future, still a little opaque and unproven. But as so often, the future is already here: it’s just not evenly distributed.
For the last few years, Waymo has been operating fully driverless cars in Phoenix and San Francisco. They’re commercially available. Anyone can download the app and hail one: I was recently passing through SF, and took the opportunity to make a few trips by Waymo. I found the experience hugely impressive, to the point that it made very clear what some parts of our future will look like.
In this essay, I will talk about my experience riding Waymos, predict the impacts that self-driving vehicles will have on our society, sketch out Waymo’s unit economics and discuss its competitive positioning vis-a-vis Uber and others, and finally argue that Waymos will totally overhaul how we think of public transit — offering a rare technological “leapfrog” opportunity to urban America.
The Experience
I hadn’t thought much about how it would be to ride in a self-driving car. Surely it’d be like taking an Uber, but without a driver — functionally, it’s all the same, right?
It’s actually totally different. And it’s wildly superior.1
The feeling of the drive is much better. Waymos accelerate very gently, and drive in a slow, defensive way such that they will never suddenly speed up or hit the brakes. In a city with lots of hills and stop-and-go traffic like SF, this is a godsend. If I were stuck with an impatient Uber driver who floors gas and brake, I’d feel nauseous after a few minutes. On the other hand, the gentleness of the Waymo means that I can read for the entire drive,2 and not even notice any traffic.
The Waymo is your own personal space. It’s really nice to have it entirely to yourself. That makes it much more relaxing than taking an Uber. When you share a small, confined space (like a car) with a stranger, it causes a very subtle stress: you’re paying attention to what they’re doing, and you think about your own actions so as not to bother them. It’s slightly taxing. Waymo obviates this.
This is really noteworthy, because it means that even having a great driver is worse than having no driver in this respect. One’s first-glance intuition might be that driverless is better than a bad driver and worse than a great driver, but this is not so. Driverless is better in both cases.
A Waymo is clearly a much safer driver than a regular human. Waymos actually keep their legal minimum distance of three feet to bicycles on the road! As a cyclist, I’ve had trucks speed past me at over sixty miles an hour with maybe six inches of clearance. I’d feel much safer sharing the roads with Waymos that are actually programmed to follow the law.
In short: the Waymo experience is great. It’s hard to imagine how good it is if you’ve never been inside one, because you’ve been used to a different paradigm your entire life. Taking a Waymo is relaxing in a way that taking an Uber (let alone driving yourself and having to actually navigate traffic) simply never is. Even if a Waymo travels a little slower than a human driver, the ride is so gentle that you’re better off on net. It turns into quiet personal time or reading time, instead of being waiting time.
They’ll be Everywhere
There’s a saying in surfing: slow is smooth. Smooth is fast. Google has played it right: fifteen years of slow-is-smooth work on Waymo, delivering an impeccable safety record and a magical experience. They are far ahead of any competition,3 ideally positioned to roll-out nationally as quickly as regulators will allow.
I’d expect for large fleets of Waymos to become commercially available in major US cities over the next few years. Approval for roll-out will become easier and easier as the cumulative safety record speaks for itself.
They’ll be Cheap
Waymo is still a rare luxury today. The SF fleet has only about 250 cars, of which 100 are on the road at any time. This makes Waymo slightly more expensive than Uber. As more Waymo vehicles become available, you might expect Waymo to undercut Uber on pricing, and take the rest as margin. But I think Waymo will race to drive down its pricing much further. Why? Because Uber is not nearly as big as the terminal market size. For comparison:
In the US, there are 1.1 billion car trips every day;
In the US, I estimate Uber and its competitors complete 19 million rides a day;4
In other words, there are ~58x more personal rides than rideshare rides in the US. The true TAM is that Waymo replaces all travel by car (and perhaps even all travel by bus, subway, etc.). To get there, Waymo has to bring its price down to the point that anyone with a car would pay to not have to drive themselves. Maximizing business value here is a volume game: the winning recipe is massively scaled deployment, with prices lower than any competition, and taking the thin margin.
Unit Economics
Operating Expenses
Not having a driver significantly lowers OpEx. Take a look at Uber:
Uber claims that its drivers get roughly 70% of the ride fare whereas drivers claim they get about 50% of the ride fare;5
Uber’s cost of revenue is about 16% of gross bookings, and their cost of operations and support is about 1.8% of of gross bookings;6
Clearly there is an opportunity to reduce the marginal cost of operating the ride by between 50 and 70%, perhaps more if the removal of driver operations, payouts, etc. further reduces costs. But Waymo’s safety record makes for even larger savings. Fewer crashes mean:
Less need for expensive repairs;
Lower insurance rates;
Longer vehicular lifespans over which they depreciate.
Long-term, you’d expect the price of a Waymo ride to be the sum of:
The cost of gas (or electricity);
The per-mile depreciation of the vehicle;
The marginal cost of any supporting software or operations (e.g. cleaning);
Whatever the average consumer is willing to pay to not drive themselves, which might be a few dollars an hour, or a little more if the experience is really great and they win back some of the opportunity cost of driving.
I think a decent first-order approximation, before factoring in any next-generation technology advances or economies of scale, is that Waymo could bring down operating costs 70% relative to Uber. The world looks very different when a $40 half-hour Uber ride suddenly becomes $13 — that’s a lot of increased mobility.
Capital Expenses + Payback Period
Waymo vehicles are not cheap! Each one costs about $200K to deploy. Recapturing this CapEx is a tall order, and it makes Waymo’s prospects less clear.
Suppose a Waymo vehicle runs a gross profit of $10 per hour,7 and it drives for 20 hours a day on average. That’s $73,000 a year in gross profits. Even if the cost of deployment comes down to $150K, it takes 2.1 years to recapture the CapEx.8 If it drives an average of 25 miles per hour, then it’s putting on 182,500 miles per year, or about 383,000 miles by the time the CapEx is recouped. That’s a lot of miles! I don’t know what the life expectancy of the vehicle is after 383K miles, but it’s probably not great. Further, if any of the expensive self-driving hardware (Lidar, sensors, etc.) has to be replaced on any regular schedule, it’s possible that an individual Waymo would take many years to recapture its upfront cost, if it can do so at all.
This suggests that Waymo would have to make very big, long-term bets, risking significant CapEx with uncertain payoff profiles. Waymo might be severely unprofitable at significant scale before it arrives at viable unit economics.9 Importantly, Waymo kind of has to do this, because it must (1) use its current market-leader advantage to build distribution while competition is scant and (2) scale up in order to have economies of scale that can bring the costs down.
A True Google Bet
But never forget: Waymo is owned by Google, and making very big, very long-term CapEx bets is the Google style. This is the true nature of the moat in Google’s search engine:10 Google has invested heavily for twenty-five years in building web crawling infrastructure. If you wanted to compete with Google on its turf today,11 and create a web crawler and search engine on par with Google’s, the level of capital expenditure would render it basically impossible: it would take billions of dollars over many years of engineering just to get to par with Google. Then you’d have to spend tens of billions of dollars trying to take market share away from Google, and only then would you be in a position where you can fight a price war on ads against Google, at the end of which neither of you will make any profits. It’d be economic insanity to try. So nobody does it, and Google’s search engine enjoys a natural monopoly and prints money.
The reason to tell that story is that there’s an analogous case for Waymo. Google could perfectly rationally deploy many billions of dollars into Waymo to obtain:
Proprietary vehicles that are a superior form factor, both in terms of rider experience and unit economics (i.e. minimizing maintenance costs);
Massive scale, creating superior ride liquidity — i.e. when a customer requests a ride, they are able to obtain one faster than with any competing service;
Superior economies of scale in purchasing, outfitting, and maintaining vehicles;
Superior technology and data, creating a better and safer drive experience;
A superior safety record translating into regulatory capture.
Google has plenty of money: $108B in pure cash on hand, and $69B in free cash flows for 2023. Self-driving cars are among the few markets with TAMs big enough to move the needle for Google, so it would make sense to burn a few billion dollars a year on Waymo for the next decade, and to start capturing profits only once the barriers to entry are too tall for competitors and Waymo is in a position of natural monopoly.12
There are two important notes here:
To believe there can be a natural monopoly, you must believe this is a winner-take-all or winner-take-most market. We’ve had a great live experiment with that over the past fifteen years: even though there is little differentiation among rideshare services, it has been very hard for new ones to compete. Ten years ago, I expected many vendors to emerge, but the reality has been that acquiring customers is so expensive and the margins are so thin that Uber has been able to take over the market, with small (shrinking) slices for Lyft and for local alternatives (primarily outside the US). By analogy, this suggests that the market for self-driving vehicles will have winner-take-most characteristics.
Google has already shown tremendous long-term thinking: they have been investing in Waymo for fifteen years now. Consider the level of conviction required to keep up this level of investment for so long, especially in the early years when deployment seemed ever-so-far away. Now that the goal is in sight, massive spending is more rational than ever.
What Happens to Uber?
Uber might go down as a strange story in business history. They’ve burned $31.4B in operating losses since 2014 to win this market. For many years, Uber (Travis Kalanick) recognized that human drivers were a transitional step, and that autonomous vehicles would eventually gobble up the space. TK had the right instinct to focus on Uber ATG starting at 2015, when it was still possible to catch-up. It’s not anymore. I expect that as soon as Waymo deploys a thousand cars in a big taxi market like LA, Vegas, or NYC, the public markets will put an expiration date on Uber.
Startups are a tough game, and the path from disruptor to disrupted can be surprisingly short. Uber was founded in 2009. If Waymo disrupts Uber by 2029, then it will have been a twenty-year-journey of posting huge losses to seize a market, scoring a few years of comparatively small operating profits, and that’s it. Over a twenty-year journey, you really do have to keep innovating — in fact, it’s so long that you may be forced to bet on, and pivot, the very definition of your business. This will have been the case for Uber. TK and team saw this; I’m not sure if their successors did.
Commutes will be back
The once-dreaded long commute is about to come back in a big and pleasant way. I would have no issue at all sitting in a Waymo for 45 minutes each way every day. It’s just a nice time to myself that I can use to nap, work, or read.
This means that the suburbs and exurbs stand to benefit meaningfully. Working in a high-cost-of-living city and then commuting from a lower-cost-of-living suburb is a common strategy, but it comes at a certain lifestyle tax: you lose a lot of time on the commute, and you have to plan around availability of transport. Inexpensive, widely available Waymos fix this.
Leapfrogging Public Transit
This brings us to public transportation: so far in this piece, I have chiefly compared Waymo to Uber. But Waymo is most compelling not as an alternative to a taxi or Uber, but as an alternative to driving yourself — or to being on public transit.
Waymo becomes most interesting as an alternative to public transit. It favorably changes the economies of scale: more riders per vehicle imply better economics, and deals with local governments can stabilize Waymo financially with long-term contracts.
Waymo as public transit is particularly attractive, because virtually all cities in the US have wound up in a position where building public transportation infrastructure is well-nigh impossible. In San Francisco, it cost $346M over 6 years to install a new set of north-south bus lanes on a straight stretch of two-mile road.13 In NYC, a new subway line is costing $2.5B per mile. Trying to “build” anything, even if it’s just sectioning off an existing part of a road with some paint, invites months or years of local political debate, environmental litigation, and runaway costs far beyond any reasonable imagination.
But we have tons of roads. And thankfully, self-driving cars do not require any more infrastructure. This sidesteps the quagmire of trying to build new public transit infrastructure, and allows us to provide great public transit in the form of driverless cars/small buses without all the administrative overhead. It’s an easy winner:
The fact that these cars can be called by app to any destination and routed efficiently by algorithm means that they offer huge accessibility and environmental advantages over public transit that always follows a fixed route and schedule.
Many people who currently drive themselves would probably be happy to carpool in a self-driving vehicle if it’s reliable and easy, which would improve congestion.
Unlike all other public transit, maintaining the infrastructure for self-driving vehicles (simple roads) is relatively easy and inexpensive.
It is ironic that for so long, every lane of road for cars was seen as zero-sum competition for public transit, and now we might achieve broad, high-quality public transit precisely via all the road space that we’ve already made available.14
In fact, this might bring American public transportation to a leapfrog moment. Many pundits have lamented that developing cities elsewhere have “leapfrogged” the US on public transportation — building subways and rail networks that put ours to shame. Over a hundred years ago, we built first-generation public transit.15 Over the last forty years, other countries built second-generation public transit. Now we have the opportunity as a nation to lead the world on third-generation public transit, and in that course develop products and expertise that can be exported.
More granularly, cities all over the US are about to have a fantastic opportunity to redirect budget from artificially expensive transit infrastructure projects toward driverless cars and small buses as next-generation public transit. A billion dollars doesn’t buy you a lot of subway stops these days, but it’ll probably buy you a terrific long-term, at-cost contract for the future of transportation.
BEST-PRACTICE DISCLOSURES
I don’t have any financial positions in Uber or Google other than indirect investments in their common stock via low-cost index funds.
The best-fitting analogy that comes to mind is the iPod of the 2000s: I remember that the advertising pitch was that it was like an MP3 player that could store far more songs, but then it turned out to be a qualitatively totally different, and much more satisfying user experience. I don’t think there were many people who ever went back from iPods to MP3 players, even as the latter became equivalent on storage.
It’s tempting to draw an analogy between regular cellphones and the iPhone, but that experiential gulf was much bigger than the gulf between Uber and Waymo.
I haven’t tried, but the ride is smooth enough that I could probably work on my laptop the whole way through.
Waymo will enjoy a deep competitive moat for years to come: any competitor will have to rush development in order to catch up to Waymo over any reasonable timeframe. Of course, rushing development means safety issues, and safety issues mean adverse regulatory actions (i.e. no roll-out). Self-driving is one of those domains where you simply have to wait (i.e. meticulously establish a safety record) for a long time to get to market. Unlike other players, Waymo has simply done all the required waiting, and that puts them in a great position of strength.
The napkin math here is:
Uber reports completing 23 million rides a day globally at ~72% market share
US/Canada revenues are $19.4B out of $31.8B globally.
Assuming revenues and ride count are directly proportional (this is false, but probably good enough for our purposes) and multiplying everything through, you get 19.48 million rides a day.
Subtract 11% because we’ve counted Canada as part of the US market and Canada has ~11% the population of the US.
Add the Taxi market, which Statista estimates at another 1.64 million rides a day.
There’s no single authoritative resource on this. It is the subject of lots of discussion on /r/uber, and the 50% figure is my estimate based on the (recent) self-reported anecdotes across those discussions on Reddit. Some drivers claim to receive as little as 30% of the fare, but I suspect that’s anomalous. When I ask drivers, I usually find they’re being paid ~50% of what I pay Uber.
This is a little over $3 gross profit per 20-minute ride, with three rides per hour. I think that’s a reasonable benchmark for what people might be willing to pay to not drive themselves (assuming a similar cost of driving themselves in terms of gas, depreciation, etc.), especially when you consider the cost of parking in many geographies.
In actuality, it would take slightly longer if you factor in the risk-free rate as opportunity cost of that upfront investment.
A big part of this would be the actual costs of the self-driving hardware coming down. For context, Waymo vehicles are currently based on the Jaguar I-PACE, which starts at an MSRP of $72,000, implying the self-driving hardware costs about $130,000. If Waymo managed to bring down the cost of the base car and the cost of the self-driving hardware, then the economics change significantly.
This paragraph sketches a somewhat contrarian view — lots of people think Google’s moat is based on network effects/positive feedback loops between ads and search. While there is some benefit there, in my opinion the true moat is the enormous infrastructural barrier to entry. I may expand this argument into a full essay in the future; let me know if you’d find that interesting.
I’m using the phrase “on its turf” specifically because one might argue that Perplexity is competing with Google — but not exactly on Google’s search engine turf. Rather, Perplexity is making competitive use of a new paradigm.
Earlier in this piece, I wrote: “Maximizing business value here is a volume game: the winning recipe is massively scaled deployment, with prices lower than any competition, and taking the thin margin.” That describes a natural monopoly.
In fairness, a significant part of this cost is because the project is joined with replacing some sewer and water lines under the same road. But it’s still far too expensive!
You might ask whether we will need more road space, but I doubt it. If there’s anything we have a lot of in the US, it’s roads. I actually think road capacity will significantly increase as street parking will almost entirely disappear — giving way to actual traffic — since:
Driverless cars will be moving almost at all times;
Regular cars on average spend 92% of their lives parked (often on the street), and people who make such seldom use of their cars will probably not want to own them anymore when they have Waymo or equivalent public transit at their disposal.
The New York City subway was once the greatest in the world!
I agree about Waymo's advantages as an Uber replacement, but I don't think the commuting picture is quite as rosy as you describe. First, If commuting is the dominant use case you will still need somewhere to park them. Most of the demand will be going downtown in the morning and to the suburbs in the evening so the cars won't have much to do between 9 and 5. Sure there will be some taxi like use cases during the day but the demand for that is tiny relative to commutes. Second, a shared ride in a waymo is probably not better than a good bus trip in a city (a frequent service single seat route). You lose the personal space and you still have to wait for a pick up and a non direct route to drop off other customers. Demand for fast transit like trains may even go up after the increased long distance commuters in Waymos slow down traffic and increase the speed premium of trains.
Good comment, thanks. The 9-5 supply/demand issue is not as clear to me, since there are alternative uses that might be productive, eg delivery of physical goods during times of low rider demands. Or they can park a little bit outside of the urban core. The problem with most buses in the US is that they are far too slow due to the high number of predetermined stops; a self driving vehicle with dynamic routing might be much more appealing. Finally, strong agree on trains. EG If Waymo solves a last-5-mile commuting problem, then trains to/from suburbs and exurbs become even more useful.